Abstract: The fisheries sector is currently contending with the hectic development of its own political economy framework being convulsed by the dynamics of decentralisation. This process is enshrouded in an environment of economic globalisation, taking place against the backdrop of the governance approach. Taking this situation as our starting point, our main goal is to quantify the effects that the Spanish port devolution process might have on the Spanish fisheries sector using a transfer function model; we take, as dependent variables, both the volumes of landings at State ports of general interest and their cash value. 
Introduction
Governance is becoming the dominant focus of marine management, particularly in port and fisheries policies. As a type of administration, it is more flexible and includes actors from different fields and tiers of government (government agencies, civil society, the media, the academic world and businesses) for which new game rules have to be devised [1], [2] .
As far as ports and harbours are concerned, there has been a profound change in the relationship between the State and the ports since the nineteen-eighties. The reasons for this include both the globalisation of the economy, resulting in new, wide-ranging and more complex traffic and relationships between agencies [3] , and the appearance of new management models which seek to increase management efficiency and responsiveness, with a consequent increase in financial autonomy and profitability. Port devolution is the most turned-to proposal in literature addressing the subject from a range of perspectives [4] , [5] . Devolution is understood here in a broad sense as the transfer of responsibility for control, technical and financial organisation and the channel of economic activity from the central administration to other institutional agencies closer to the port [6] , [4] .
It must be borne in mind that 'devolution' has taken place in all kinds of port systems, from Anglo-Saxon [7] to Mediterranean countries [8] , with Spain situated in the context of the latter. Spanish ports have been defined under the maritime law as public domain since the 19 th century, although there had also been previous legislative precedents. With the passage of time, the State has gradually loosened its control over ports and harbours to the point of decentralising both management (Act 27/1992) and political control from the central government to regional administrations 2 (Act 62/1997, which amends the earlier Act 3 ). Both of these initiatives set forth a new distribution of powers and responsibilities for port issues: the central administration retains coordination of the so-called State ports of general interest, as well as ports with intense commercial traffic and broad hinterlands where fisheries traffic and the remaining commercial traffic exist side-by-side. All remaining ports, essentially comprising fishing ports, with sparse commercial traffic and marinas, are exclusively managed by regional governments [9] .
This same political and scientific framework has influenced fisheries activity since the nineteen-eighties, with one of the most interesting proposals being the 'governance approach' [10] . Symes [11] understands that, in a similar way to what is happening in commercial ports [4] , there are three different agendas necessary for the new model to be achieved: privatisation, co-governance and regionalisation through, for example, decentralization. This is the route that has been followed in Spain, including in fisheries policy [12] .
Notwithstanding, since the nineteen-eighties, Spanish fisheries policy has been shot through with contradictory principles: 'downwards' devolution -in the decentralisation direction -has been uneasily combined with a transfer of political power to the European Commission, which applies a more top-down approach [13] . Notably, participation and devolution -in their respective embodiments of regionalisation and decentralisation -do not have a linear relationship; more devolution does not mean greater participation of local and regional agencies [14] .
The impacts that these processes have on the different types of traffic and the efficiency of port operations are currently under study. Both quantitative models [15] , [8] , as well as more qualitative methodologies are being used both for port policy [16] and for fisheries management in keeping with the principles of integrated coastal management [17] .
This article uses quantitative research to analyse the results of the convergence of port economic policy and fisheries models in Spain, with the hypothesis that, in both cases, we are witnessing a new political-port regime that displays the theory of governance, in general, and one of its forms, decentralisation, in particular. Using transfer function models, fisheries traffic and the value of the catches at State ports of general interest are taken as variables in the analysis. 8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 This approach is a limited version of the model in [8] . Firstly, we used the HodrickPrescott filter with the adjustments proposed by [18] for annual series. 5 The aim of this is to eliminate spurious effects, whether of a temporal nature, or due to changes in the way the variables are historically computed -for example, when adding the value of the fresh fish in the markets to catches over the 45 year period considered in the study (from 1962 to 2006) . Secondly, to test the structural break hypothesis, we have chosen to estimate transfer function models, in the tradition of [29], although we have extended the latter approach to take into account ideas on endogenous-break testing, according to [20] . The models considered are: 
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We have also included an error term, where j = 3, as well as a constant term (
order to capture the effects of additional variables not directly included in the specification. For the dummy variables we have used step formulations (level shift) 6 . These formulations produced the best fit when estimating models (1) and (2). 5 The scant variability of the series of continuously diminishing Spanish fisheries traffic excludes a filter being applied using a non-observable component model, as the result would be a linear trend and a constant slope, in other words, the variance of the error term is zero. 8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 65
Results
The estimate of models (1) and (2) According to (3), the port devolution process that began with Act 27/92 had no effect on the development of fisheries traffic at State ports of general interest. However, according to (4), it had a negative effect on the economic value of said traffic, significant to 99 percent 7 . An approximation of the measurement of this impact from the port devolution process can be obtained from equation (5) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 towards other types of traffic and port activities which are, a priori, more profitable than fishing, such as container traffic and logistics areas. An example of this can be seen in the percentage share of investments in the Spanish port system over the last 12 years. On average, only 2.94% of investments have been made in fisheries compared to 7.14% in logistics activities, for example. The investments made in (the currently over-sized) fisheries structures in the past under the developmentalist model [21] , 8 probably act as a curb on the planning of new investments. Perhaps profitability is not the only factor that should be taken into account, however. Other traffic, such as container traffic, that requires expensive vessels to be constantly at sea, is extremely sensitive to labour disputes. The traditional labour disputes in the fisheries sector may have influenced these investment decisions.
The alternative logic is the process of locating and concentrating fisheries traffic at regional ports specialising in said traffic that are not part of the "general interest" network. This phenomenon is occurring both in the process of transfer to regional governments (the fishing port of Bonanza ceased to belong to the "general interest" port of Seville and became a regional port in the mid nineteen-nineties, for example), and in the voluntary transfer of fleets (from the port of Vilagarcía to the regional port of Puebla del Caramiñal, for example).
The indifference of Spanish fisheries to institutional variables continues with the lack of significance of Spain's entry into the EEC in models (1) and (2) . As such, the appraisal of the Common Fisheries Policy continues to be controversial [22] , beyond any bureaucratic issues that might be involved [23] and despite the positive effects on particular aspects, such as an improvement in profitability of fishing fleets [24] .
Another interesting conclusion that can be drawn from this work is the indirect relationship between fresh fish and the evolution of the GDP. At the end of the nineteen-eighties, fisheries development stopped responding to the evolution of the economic cycle (see panel A in Figure 1 ). Fishing-ground restrictions meant that the foreseeably greater demand for fresh fish, linked to the expansion of the Spanish economy, could not be met. This explains the non-significance of ) log(GDP t HPTr  in model (3) . And yet, the inflexibility of the offer faced with variations in demand caused by the economic cycle is reflected in the significant positive effect of ) log(GDP t HPTr  in (4). In short, the variations in fresh fish prices are reflected in economic fluctuations, which overreact to these (see panel B in Figure 1 ).
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